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IN TilE SUPRI:llE COUl":T 
Of' THf: STi\TE OF U'i'i\H 
STATE OF UTAH, in the 
int~rest of Evan Orgill 
an(; Bart Orgill, persons 




Case No. 15140 
BRIEF ON APPEAL OF 
RESPONDENT, STATE OF 
UTAH 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case in which the Utah State Division of 
Family Services petitioned the Juvenile Court of Salt Lake 
County to permanently deprive the natural parents of Evan 
and Bart Orgill of all rights to said children pursuant 
to the provisions of Section 78-3a-48 (formerly known as 
Section 55-10-109) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE JUVENILE COURT 
The Juvenile Court, the Honorable John Farr Larson 
presiding, after trial before said Court, granted the 
Petition and on March 22, 1977, entered its Order terminating 
all rights, including residual rights, of Leonard Orgill, 
father, and Joyce Thomason, mother, in and to said children. 
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Th'c r~·sponc:2nt State of Utah asks thal lh0 c1i .l_·; 
of the ,Juvenile Cou-cL be affirm<"u. 
STi\TEilENT OF PACTS 
The respondent State of Utah does not feel that 
appellant has made a complete and adequate Statement of 
Facts, and for this reason accepts and adopts the state 
of facts set forth by co-respondents. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED 
TO SUPPORT TERMINATION OF APPELL.l\NT'S 
PARENTAL RIGHTS BY REASON OF ABANDONMENT. 
Appellant contends that the evidence was insuffick I 
suppcrt an abandonment of the two children Evan and Bart, 
on the grounds: 
1. Placing of the children with the Divvision of r;j 
Services was prompted by the appellant's concern, not he· 
disregard, for the children, (Appellant's Brief, pg. 5), 
2. There is nothing in the evidence to prove t~t 
Lake City between June, 1974, and the present, 
appellant did not attempt to see the children when in 5'·' 
(Ibid. : :.1 
3. The Division repeatedly frustrated appellants 
efforts to see the children, (Ibid. pg. 6) 
4. The Divi:c -:in failed to take steps to reunite 
appella 
'· 
with the children, (Ibid. pg. 6), and 
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':i. There wilo nothi,1g in the evidence cc;tiJ.blisnirl<J 
that app2llant had r· ability to s·12port the: children, 
nor w0s she legall~ ordered to do so. (Ibid. pg. 7) 
It may well be 
that appellants initial motivati'.in in voluntarily placing 
the children with the Division was her concern for them. 
Initial motivation is not the determinative factor in a 
finding of abandonment. The Utah statute regarding 
abandonment says nothing of motive. Abandonment is a 
question of fact determined as follows: 
"It shall be primia facie evidence of 
abandonment that the parent or parents, 
although having legal custody of the 
child, have surrendered physical custody 
of the child, and for a period of six 
months following such surrender have not 
manifested to the child or to the person 
having physical custody of the child a 
firm intention to resume physical custody 
or make arrangements for the care of the 
child." (Section 78-3a-48(b) UCA 1953) 
The children were surrendered to the Division for 
placement in a foster home in February, 1974. They have 
been in the foster home ever since. The issue under 
consideration is whether appellant has manifested a 
"firm intention to resume physical custody or to make 
arrangements for the care of the . [children] . " 
A "firm intention" obviously contemplates something more 
than perfunctory statements and broken promises. The 
fact is that appellant has visited with the children only 
-3-
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(R. 63) I cl.lid sorw~l2-!L·2S in June, lS'"/1, (JC Jr,·,). 
1974, uPLJ•.:llant rno·.·cu tu Denver (R. lGO) witi:Ot'.l cu,;,. 
any future arrang<:;;:1ents or plans for the childrPr,. ID. 
174). On Septer.iber 17, 1974, appellant finally wrol~ '· 
the children. (R. 266-267) . She has not writ ten sine: 
(R. 160-161, 170). She has provided no support for tr.~ 
children, ev2n though she has had regular employment si:.: 
October, 1974, nor has she even sent them a present 01 
remembrance since December 1974. (R. 169 ) . She has nc 
even sent them a birthday card. (R. 169). 
As to insufficiency Claim No. 2: It would be diff1: 
for respondents to carry the burden of proving thJ.t aF;;c:.• 
did not attempt to visit the children during her visits: 
Salt Lake City. The respondents cannot be under an obl1 I 
to prove a negative. Of her 7 or 8 visits to Salt La'.- · 
between July, 1974, and February, 1976, there is affirr.a:. 
evidence of only two attempts by her to try and see, ~ 
even ask to see, the children. (R. 86,90). 
As to insufficiency Claim No. 3: In December, 19", 
after six months of silence in regard the children, 
came to Salt Lake and while here asked to see the chil 
The social worker felt that a visit would be inadvis:iblc 
unless appellant had definite plans for taking and ca 
for the children. (R. 86). Appellant later ack 1101·:k" 
-4-
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,1!1d acF'-'-'c1 thdt it \'!ilS best s::" not sc2 the childrc:n at 
tlut time. (R. 88). On July 28, 1975, appellant, while 
dl)uin in Salt L:t ·c City, asked to see the children. She 
cume unrtnnouncecl and the children were on vacation. A 
visit was not denied by the Division, but was impossible 
to arrange. (R. 90). There is no evidence that appellant, 
aside from these two occasions, has ever asked to see or 
attempted to see her children. If she had done so, surely 
she could have cited specific instances during the trial. 
The record certainly doesn't "reek" (Appellant's Brief, 
Pg. 6) with frustrations of appellant's efforts to be 
reunited with or resume physical custody of the children. 
As to insufficiency Claim No. 4: The fact is that 
the Division did take steps, and went as far as it could 
as a practical matter, in attempting to reunite appellant 
with the children. In her letter of September 6, 1974, 
social worker Christine Colver advised appellant to contact 
the Division in order to establish a plan for the return 
of the children. (R. 243). Appellant made no such contact. 
On November 18, 1974, a Division worker again wrote to 
appellant suggesting steps she should take and decisions 
she should make in order to get her children back (R. 254). 
In December, 1974, the social worker attempted to work 
out a plan with appellant to enable return of the children 
lo her, but obtained no corrunittment or cooperation from 
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appelL:i11t. (!'. 8G). 
a socl~l workur in~uircd again as to appellant's int• 
in th•_: children. (H. 'H, 270). The Di,rision was certJ, 
willing to work out a pro'Jro.m to o.ssist appellant 1-1i :-1, 
the children - but aprk•llant evidenced little intcre:;' t 
resume care and responsibility for the children until s .. 
was actually faced with their permanent loss, over Lo 
years after she had voluntarily placed them with the Div: 1 
In the case of State of Utah, In the Interest r:_f~'-l 
et al., 514 P.2d 797(1973), likewise an abandonment ca~e. 
the natural mother made a similar argument; to-wit, that 
the Division had failed to take affirmative action to 
reuni tc her with her children. The Mario A. case was oc 
its facts almost identical to the instant case, involvin~ 
a mother who placed three small children in the custody c 
the Division and then for two and one-half years show~ 
very little interest in them. (514 P.2d at pg. 799). M 
in the instant case the Division caseworker had pre~ri~ 
certain conditions to be followed by the mother in order 
to regain custody of the children. ( 514 P. 2d at pg. 798 1 · 
As in the instant case the mother failed to conform. 
failed to visit the children, phone them, or inquire b_ 
phone as to their welfare, all as in the instant case. 
then complained that the Division workers should ha~ 
sought her out and initiated visits between her uncl t!l'' 
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child r,' 1 • ( S 14 P. 2 :i al: P:J . 7 9 9) . 
Lh<..:' t_crr; inat io-,1 order, stzi r~c~'.l: 
"\Ve do not think the casework2rs are 
obligated to go to the extremes which 
ap~ellant claims they should have done 
in order to kind~ ' and increase a small 
flame of desire to be reunited with her 
children. \·le think if she was to escape 
the provision of the statute regarding 
evidence of abandonment, the duty was upon 
her to manifest an intere~t within the 
six month period after loss of custody. 
In this case she failed to manifest a firm 
intention to resume physical custody of 
her children for over two years." (514 
P.2d at pg. 799). 
It is therefore the duty of the natural parent to 
manifest her interest in the children and to establish 
a record in that regard when faced with their loss. In 
the instant case there were successive long periods of 
time; from June, 1974, to December, 1974, from December, 
1974, to July 1975, from July 1975, to February, 1976, in 
which appellant made no attempt to contact the children, 
made no inquiry as to their welfare, and manifest no firm 
intent to resume custody or responsibility for the children. 
It would be error to fault the State for her lack of 
interest and establishment of firm intent. 
As to insufficiency Claim No. 5: Contrary to appellant's 
Brief (pg. 7), there was evidence as to appellant's ability 
to support the abandoned children. She has had continuous 
employment from September, 1974, as a nurses aid (R. 168), 
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month. ( n. 236). 
whether or not the Juvenile Court ever did or <lid na~ 
aJJpelL:mt to contribute to the S'1pport of her childr~!', 
whether the Juvenile Court m.1:::e a finding that appell i:.: 
was unable to do so. In any event when children are 
voluntarily placed with the Division of Family Services i'. 
is for the Di vision to determine whether the parent v; 1 L 
pay a fee for foster care, (Section 55-15b-13 UCA 1953), 
not the Juvenile Court. If a stone has been cast at 
appellar:c by the Juvenile court Judge, in his finding, for 
her failure to make any contribution whatsoever to the 
support of the children, we think it was well thrown 
and said failure is certainly evidentiary as to her "fi::: 
intention" to make arrangements for the care of the chic· 
Without equivocation our legislature has stated that "["', 
woman shall support her child; (Section 78-45-4 
UCA 1953) 
Conclusion regarding Point I: This court has ado;·., 
an objective test in determining whether or not a parer: 
has abandoned his child in an involuntary termj nation f'. 
1 
I 
ceeding under Section 78-3a-48(b) (Supra); to-wit, has! ' 
parents' conduct ". demonstrated a conscious dis""· 
of the obligations owed by a parent to a child, kc:i:. 
the destruction of the parent-child relationship · · 
-8-
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and In_ Re B . .::f:_• Alaska, 530 P.2d 747(1975) .) 
The CdSe of D.M. v. State (Supra.) is of particular 
interest as it seems to parallel our instant case. In 
that case it was held: 
[l] We hold that the evidence supports 
the conclusion of the trial court that the 
mother's parental rights should be termi-
nated by reason of abandonment. Her failur.e 
to communicate with or to visit D.M. sine 
1965, h?r failure to support the child in 
any way ~ither emotionally or fi~~~cially, 
together with the lo:'q term comrnitf'.1<ent 0£ 
D.M. to J fost~er home convinces ',c: that the~ 
child h~s bee~ abandoned. We take into · 
~idc~ation as-wefi--:u;:e finding of the trial 
~-:_that it wa·-; in D~M. 's own interest that 
~.'_ant's parental rights be severed. That 
finding is strongly supported by the reports 
of 01-. Boyd, a qualified psychiatrist, who 
made psychological evaluations of the appellant, 
D.M., and D.M. 's foster parents. (515 P.2d at 
pg. 1236) (Emphasis added). 
In the instant case (with the exception of one letter) 
appellant has not communicated with her children and her 
last visit took place in June, 1974. As in D.M. v. State, 
this appellant has also failed to provide her children 
with either emotional or financial support. (R. 168, 169). 
Further, both cases involve long-term foster-home care, 
and are supported by psychological studies. (R. 222-235; 
239-242; 244-252). 
-9-
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[2] Wh0thc t: n"t thcl'."n has h:·cn <'Ill 
mJ~Ur:~• ~~.:E·>,~:~~>,'f ~:1 · 
Si.ib]ee .ve1nLc.>nt -~;:anr:L.:icdoTI- n focus. · 
to~':J mu, ·~--:- 1::te!\B.On--~-t:1c-:: I).J.J:;-- t'~·i~~-, 
fuf1:Fi· .. -.:~.T' .. s a·td h::i;!~s- C:oi:: · thco clnldi!P' 
too li -c :.le' on U1e r.lore ·in~;:iortdr![~ elem~,; -
of ho·,, w2il the par-:,nts h;1ve di_:;c:1drge~ 1 • 
th•• ir pare.ital responsibility. · ---
D.M. v. StQte, supra, 515 at page 1236. 
(Emphasis added) 
In the instant case, appellant has been short on we--
' .. I 
as well as actions. As sununarized by the Juvenile Court i 
in its "Findings of Fact," (R. 215) 
"B . . the only positive steps taken by 
the mother to affect return of these childr~ 
has been phone calls and letters to the Divisi: 
of Family Services, a request for a home stud/ 
in Colorado, and the leasing of a three bedroc· 
home. 
C. The mother has not supported these chillre: 
al though she has had regular employment since 
October, 1974. 
D. The mother has not provided emotional 
support for said children. She has not sent 
Christmas gifts (except Christmas, 1974) or 
birthday cards; the mother wrote one letter 
to the children." 
The test [for abandonment] focuses on two gues~i~;· 
has the parent's conduct evidenced a disregard for his 
parental obligation, and has that disregard led to t~ 
destruction of the parent-child relationship?" 
I 
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(1975). In adc:i.tio11 to 
di srv,ilrding hccr pare11tal obligations by fai Lure to maint-1 t_ 11 
contact with her chil::::en, appellant admiL; thut t:\.!(·e ::.:; 
no·:1 no meaningful relationship between her and the children. 
(R. 167). And f~rther, the psychological reports and 
testimony based thereon strongly indicate that both boys 
would suffer trauma if taken from their foster home where 
they have established a deep emotional commitment and 
psychological parent-child relationship (R. 26-31, 40-44, 
60, 248, 251.). It appears obvious that appellant has 
consciously disregarded her obligations to her children. 
Such disregard constitutes an abandonment. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS UNFIT OR INCOMPETENT BY 
REASON OF CONDUCT OR CONDITIONS SERIOUSLY 
DETRIMENTAL TO HER CHILDREN. 
Appellant acknowledges that ". the court must be 
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the con-
duct or condition [of the parent(s)] is seriously detrimental 
in its effect on the child . . . " (Appellant's Brief p. 8). 
She has not, however, challenged the validity or accuracy 
of the rather thorough psychological studies and reports 
and other evidence supporting the Juvenile Court's decision. 
Dr. Gordon B. Wilson, consulting clinical psychologist, 
who evaluated appellant on lJovernber 27, 1976, concluded: 
-11-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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-~l•:J f:< 1 the:r (Jf' ,~_!J• )lt_~,,r•c:nl Cll 1 l'~j t I 
•.:.·,~1lu :. 1~ v"'' ·' di ffi• ·lt fo· 11:» 
to CO[J·e '.:1.t'1 c-;·10 tiorc,:il p::ol i2r;s Lli yo'"~.r;·_ .. 
aged chllci'.';;1. (IL p. 227) . Sl1c• ';·.·u 
to be a cerson 1·1ho will sinccrclv attc:::•ut 
to Jo heL· bc.3t to cop2 1·1iti1 whd~··cvcr cl;',_ 
cul+-.ics arise, but a person who l1as gr 
limitations in coping skills." (I<. p. 22L) 
Dr. II. Mcix Cutler, clinical psychologist, concluc1cci: 
" It is my consid-2red opi:-iion th;•t the:;co 
boys ought to be ad~)ted by the Roscrs 
(foster parents) since their natu·cal pan·;1ts 
apparently either are not interested in th.cn1 
or are not able to t:ake care of tt·1c.-.1 anc.i tb~" 
bothba.:ily need str'..lcture- to coun'::.-:rmz111d t~ .. · 
obvious emotional problems apparent in both 
boys' protocals." (R. p. 252)(Ernphasisadded) 
The evidence pertaining to appellant's unfitness and ir.-
competency appears to be uncontroverted. 
is in fact insufficient, appellant should state how or"' 
Unless shown to be clearly against the weight of the e•: 
the decision of the court below must stand. 
According to appellant, "In the instant case, no sr.: .j 
is made in the evidence that there is any causal_ ~ 
between any detrimental effect on Evan and Bart by cor.:::: 
or condition of the appellant." (Appellant's Brief P· s,. 
Respondent would merely point out the inconsistant re 1·-'· 
which could arise from a requirement of "causal cor:nec'.: 
Assuming no adverse effects prior to abandonment, it i.: .. 
defy all reason to require a court to return childrrn: 
an environment which would most certainly be detri~·· 
-12- I 
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IJ_,-. \'Jils::m 's report clearly demcms'-.rzitc the= in irl~qu:Jr: ces 
and incurn1>-'"tence of both the u.ppellant and her husb-ind Ke· .:o~:h. 
(R. 272-235). Further, his ''Psychological Evaluatio~" report 
of Ev~n and Dzirt Orgill indicates the existence of adverse 
effects prior to separation from the natural parents: 
"It is evident that this [Evan] is 
extremely frightened that his structure is 
going to be destroyed again. He was old 
enough when he was taken from his parents, 
and while he was with his natural parents, 
to be tr2r.1matized by their behavior. * * * 
He is terrified to get too close to people 
because that's the way to get hurt, to be 
rejected as he was by his natural parents 
and reportedly especially by his mother." 
(R. 248) 
That the boys are better off where they are now is also 
reflec~ed by the report: 
"[Bart) very much wants to stay right where 
he is and feels that the foster parents are 
his real parents" (R. 231). 
* * * 
"Both boys reflect the consideration and 
love of the Rosers and it seems to me they 
ought to be a permanent family." (R. 252). 
As stated in the case of .!_n Re~, supra, in recent 
years the courts have become increasingly aware of the 
rights of the children." Respondent submits that appellant's 
disregard of her parental obligations has led to the destruction 
of the parent-child relationship and that the best interests 
of the children dictate a legal severance of that relationship. 
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•'slab:! .~t:!d bc!lh'L'''" Llir~ child i.lart ond the f.•stc·,- U 
(R. l'i) In fact, h,) thinLo. his naL.ural parL''1ls clr" c! 
and has no image of them wh;:itsoever. (H. 11). 'l'hi" Coe:_ 
is no doubt aware of the peo·dagogiccil debate going o~ ic 
social work circles and family law courts across thi·; 
land as to the n.1tural parent pr2sumption vs. th:: ps;·~'·-­
logical parent presumption. (See Drs. Goldstein, Fre•JJ ~: 
Solnit, Beyond the Best Interest of the Child) The inst: 
case seems a classic example of where the best interest 
of the child dictates that custody should remain with t'." 
psychological parents. In the case of Ross v. Hoffman, 
Md. Ct. Spec App, 1976, 264 A.2d 596, it was held that 
"mothering" is a function and not just a biological fac• i 
and that finding by the trial court that the interest c' 
the child is best served by reraaining with the "psyc~t-
parent" was not in error. In that case the Maryland co~: 
also held that a long period of separation between natu:. 
parent and child served to rebut the presumptive prefe:;· 
for the natural parent, and that although the period o'. 
separation did not of itself require custody he deni 2~: 
natural parent, it CJ.t least put both parent and surro~:-
on an even keel. The Court al so suggested that acld1ti:· 
preference should be given to th2 surrog;:ite when tile: -
was voluntarily surrendered as opposed to a court-ct 
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t' ,_: of cu:-_:~~'- ,_: 
\ ,' ·1 ; (' ' r r-: ~ ll ]_ 1 y j_ J, 1 ~J - ; --~ SE: ·l by t l1 C: tr i a l CO l l rt ' 3 Cl. f:_ t :_"l 1 :i ~ ~ lo 
C'l' lL ,,:-_·the clef':::lt of cha:-tce fr·ou: the ch.~ld's futu•_-.-,_ 
Cerldinly all thc:>s:-c considerations which imprcss2cl the 
M<lryland Court in denying the custody petition of the 
natural parent arc present in our instant case. 
In the cas~ of In re John F., Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas, 
1976, 3 FLR 2160, it was held that in a termination 
of parental rights proceeding involving three children 
placed in foster care, the biological fact of parentaye 
is unimportant when a psychological parent-child relation-
ship has been established. 
In any event this Court cannot ignore its numerous 
commitments to act in the best· interest of the child, (see 
State in the Interest of Mario A., supra at pg. 799), and 
its recognition that the welfare of the child is paramount 
to any custody rights in the natural parents. (In re State 
in the Interest of Jennings, 432 P.2d 879, 1967; State in 
the Interest o~ Winger, 538 P.2d 1311 (1976)). The great 
weight of the evidence in the instant case preponderates 
in favor of terminating the appellants parental rights 
if our desire is to serve the best interest of the child. 
At least one Court of which respondent is aware has even 
sugqested that the right of a child to be cut from the 
control of his biological parent when it is in his best 
-15-
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rise:_; to--~:.-=._ lt_~':•:_·l o: d cn11:::::_-it.:_1_1Lic1rt.,l 
biologi,--:al parent'.:;, seer:1ingly woulJ be· uncu·1stj(-11-L·~ 
(l_n_..2:..c:_~~y:, N.Y. Fa:n. Ct., 1977, 393 N.Y.S. 2cl 51~). 
The Juvenile Court correctly terminated appell 1r,t'; 
parental rights. There was sufficient evidence in zrc 
record to support the Court's determination that a;:·Jella·· 
has abandoned her children and was unfit or incompete~'.: 
reason of conduct or condition seriously detrir.iental to 
them. This Court should affirm the decision of the Ju·1e:_ 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of October, r· 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
~torney General 
~ d-~/!ir /)_ '177t~-2.-f-'-/ 
1FRANKLJN B. MATHESON 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
OLOF JOHANNSON 
Deputy County Attorney 
Salt Lake County 
Attorneys for Respondent State: 
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I certify two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
R2spond~nt StatP of Utah were mailed this day of 
Octob2r, 1977, to (1) Don Blackham Attorney for Appellant, 
2525 South 3200 lve.c;t, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84119, (2) 
David E. Littlefield, Esq., Guardian Ad Litem, Suite 707, 
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (3) David S. 
Dolowitz, Attorney for Foster Parents, Evan and Bart Orgill, 
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